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On January 8, 2002, President George W. Bush signed into law the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) 
Act, which many consider the most significant federal intervention into education in the United States 
since the authorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act in 1965.  Under NCLB, states 
were required to adopt accountability systems based on student proficiency on statewide math and reading 
exams, and to measure proficiency within student subgroups (e.g., students from low income families, 
students with limited English proficiency).  States must impose escalating sanctions on schools that fail to 
satisfy Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) requirements for exam proficiency, including allowing students 
to transfer to other public schools, forcing schools to pay for students from low-income families to enroll 
in after-school tutoring programs, and, ultimately, closing or restructuring persistently failing schools.
1   
While school accountability has received much attention from economists, there is no nationwide 
study of the impact of NCLB on school personnel and students.  We aim to fill this gap by investigating 
the links between the accountability incentives under NCLB and a wide array of outcomes measured for 
nationally representative samples.  To this end, we assemble a new dataset on the determination of AYP 
status for schools nationwide during the introduction of NCLB, and use these data to measure the degree 
to which schools faced moderate or severe risks of failing.  We exploit the fact that each state selects its 
own standardized tests and rules for satisfying AYP, generating numerous cases where a school near the 
margin for satisfying its own state’s AYP requirements would have almost certainly failed or almost 
certainly passed AYP if it were located in another state.
2  This allows us to implement a difference-in-
differences style approach, comparing differences in outcomes for schools on and away from the AYP 
margin within the same state to the difference in outcomes between similar schools in other states, neither 
of which is on the AYP margin. 
  We measure outcomes in nationally representative samples of teachers and students using the 
non-public versions of the Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) and the Early Childhood Longitudinal 
Survey (ECLS).  We find that accountability pressure from NCLB reduces teachers’ perceptions of job 
security and increases work hours, particularly among untenured teachers.  We also find evidence of 
                                                 
1 States must also publish school report cards, and schools' AYP status may affect school prestige and local property 
values (see Figlio and Lucas, 2004).  
2 As we demonstrate below, states vary widely in the percent of schools that fail to make AYP, and much of this 
variation is due to policy parameters (e.g., rules regarding the minimum enrollment for subgroups to count towards 
AYP, the grade levels that count towards AYP, and confidence or “safe harbor” adjustments to proficiency rates for 
schools that would otherwise have not made AYP) rather than academic achievement.      
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teachers shifting time away from direct instruction and, for schools with very low chances of meeting 
NCLB requirements, away from instruction in science and social studies.   
Despite concerns regarding the impact of NCLB on students, we find that short-term NCLB 
pressure has either positive or neutral effects on student achievement in math, reading, and science on 
low-stakes examinations.  Students enrolled in schools with a moderate risk of failing to make AYP score 
0.07 standard deviations higher in reading than comparable students in similar schools that were well 
above the margin for making AYP.  Estimated effects for math and science are also positive (0.04 and 
0.05 standard deviations, respectively) but not statistically significant in our preferred empirical 
specification.  We also find no evidence of differential effects of NCLB pressure on students in 
particularly crucial subgroups or students with scores close to the passing threshold on their states' 
examinations.  In addition, achievement gains from short-term NCLB pressure do not come at the 
expense of students' reported enjoyment of learning or reported anxiety over testing.   
The paper proceeds as follows.  In Section 2, we present a framework for how schools might be 
expected to respond to incentives under an accountability system like NCLB and discuss prior related 
empirical work.  Section 3 describes the NCLB data we have collected as well as the SASS and ECLS 
survey data.  We present our methodology and results for predictions of AYP failure probabilities in 
Section 4, and our estimated effects of NCLB on teachers and students in Section 5.  Section 6 concludes.   
 
2.  Conceptual Framework and Related Literature 
We first present a framework for allocation of school resources under a system of accountability 
such as No Child Left Behind.  Schools have various resources they can use to improve student skills 
(e.g., school staff, curriculum, facilities, parental involvement, etc.), and all resources have associated 
costs.  Subject to a budget constraint, schools choose an allocation based on preferences about the relative 
importance of helping students improve different types of skills and the relative importance of helping 
different types of students make improvements.  There are also competing demands that constrain the 
amount and allocation of school resources; school staff members care about their own leisure time and 
local taxpayers care about their consumption of other goods and services. 
  More formally, we classify resources into four types: the first (denoted u) helps to improve all 
skills for all students (e.g., the overall effort level of teachers), the second (denoted as) is skill-specific and  
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serves all students (e.g., math lessons that equally help all students learn math), the third type (denoted bi) 
is student-specific and serves all skills (e.g., providing individual students with lessons to improve study-
skills), and the fourth (denoted cis) is skill-specific and student-specific (e.g., individual math tutoring).  
Suppose there are two categories of student skills that schools aim to improve, one which is measured on 
standardized tests (s=m), and another which is not (s=z).  Schools place weights (denoted  is) on skill 
acquisition for each student, depending on the preferences of school staff and the community.  Finally, let 
l denote resources devoted to consumption of goods and services that are valued by the community and 
school staff but are unrelated to skill acquisition (e.g., teacher leisure).  Schools with N students and total 
resources equal to K will choose an allocation of resources to maximize:  
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In the equation above, the function U determines the value received by community members and school 
staff for non-skill resources (l) , and the function fis maps other resources into the performance of student i 
in skill s.  Schools choose an optimal allocation of resources given this objective function and budget 
constraint, which we will call “business as usual.” 
  A system of accountability and ratings such as NCLB introduces benefits or costs that depend on 
the fraction of students who pass standardized tests.  Suppose that an additional resource (denoted di) is 
available which increases the probability that student i passes the standardized tests but does not improve 
skill acquisition.  The school now chooses an allocation of resources to maximize: 
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In this equation, i is idiosyncratic noise due to imperfect test measurement (with mean zero and known 
variance), the function gi maps resources and test measurement error into whether student i passes the  
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standardized tests, and the function V maps the school-wide pass rate into benefits or costs.
3  Note that 
resources that do not improve measured skills (az and ciz) do not enter in the function gi. 
  The provisions of NCLB essentially impose costs on schools with pass rates below a certain 
threshold (AYP).  Formally, let V take the following form:  
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In other words, the school is worse off if the pass rate falls below some threshold P*, but all other 
variation in the pass rate above or below that threshold does not have immediate consequences related to 
NCLB.  The “all or nothing” structure has important implications for the accountability pressure different 
schools face.  Because input allocations and the variance of test measurement error are known, schools 
will form expectations about their probabilities of making AYP.  If a school has a very high probability of 
making AYP under its optimal pre-NCLB resource allocation, it will encounter very little pressure to 
improve and, consequently, resource allocation under NCLB should resemble “business as usual.”  In 
contrast, if a school expects to be close to the margin of making AYP under its optimal pre-NCLB 
resource allocation, the school and its community will face considerable pressure to improve student pass 
rates.  This is a key identifying assumption in our methodology.
4  
Most optimistically, schools will respond to accountability pressure by improving their technical 
efficiency or economic efficiency (or both) without any increased costs or negative effects on students' 
skill acquisition.  For example, a school might adopt a more cost effective reading curriculum which 
improves gi for at least some students without decreasing fis for any students or skills.  Similarly, a school 
might improve economic efficiency by finding a more cost effective mix of inputs, perhaps by hiring a 
different mix of instructional staff to provide new combinations of u, as, bi,, and cis.. 
                                                 
3 Alternatively, the function V could enter into the school’s budget constraint, rather than the utility function, but the 
qualitative results from this alternative framework would be the same.  Note that, for simplicity, V is based on the 
overall student proficiency rate on a single test, whereas NCLB holds schools accountable for proficiency rates for 
the overall student population and additional subgroups of students on both math and reading tests. 
4 Schools with a very low probability of making AYP in the current year will also face pressure to improve over a 
longer period of time.  Our empirical work focuses on comparisons of schools near the margin with schools with 
high probabilities of making AYP, but we also test for effects of schools having low probabilities of making AYP.  
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Without improvements to efficiency, changes in resource allocation in response to NCLB will 
involve tradeoffs.  School personnel and community members may reduce resources devoted to 
consumption (l) and direct them towards improving student skills.  Accountability pressure may also 
induce schools to spend fewer resources promoting non-tested skills (az and ciz), more resources 
promoting tested skills (am and cim), and more resources targeted to particular students (bi, cim) for whom 
extra resources will most improve their probability of passing the standardized exams.  Finally, schools 
may allocate resources to activities that improve pass rates (di) but not skill acquisition.   
Most empirical research on school accountability focuses on the impacts of state and local 
systems, many of which preceded No Child Left Behind (e.g., Ladd & Zelli, 2002; Hanushek & 
Raymond, 2005; Chakrabarti, 2007; Rouse et al., 2007; Chiang, 2009; Rockoff & Turner, 2010).  Several 
studies find evidence that accountability pressure causes schools to reallocate resources in ways that raise 
average student achievement.  However, schools have also been found to shift resources towards students 
and subjects that are most critical to the accountability rating (e.g., Booher-Jennings, 2005; Reback, 2008; 
Neal & Whitmore Schanzenbach, 2010), teach to the test (Jacob, 2005; Figlio & Rouse, 2006), remove 
low performing students from the testing pool (Figlio & Getzler, 2006; Figlio, 2006, Cullen & Reback, 
2006), or cheat (Jacob & Levitt, 2003).   
Knowledge about the impacts of NCLB is still nascent.  Among the few studies that apply 
rigorous methods, most examine only student performance on high stakes tests in one state or one city 
(Springer, 2008; Krieg, 2008; Ladd & Lauen, 2010; and Neal & Whitmore Schanzenbach, 2010).  These 
studies have found that students enrolled in schools failing AYP tend to make greater than expected gains 
on high-stakes tests, though there is conflicting evidence concerning heterogeneous effects on students at 
different parts of the performance spectrum.  Only two prior studies examine the impact of NCLB 
incentives in multiple states.  Ballou and Springer (2008) examine variation in the grade levels tested for 
NCLB across seven states and find that students generally perform better on low-stakes exams during 
years when they took high-stakes tests, particularly for students near the margin of passing their high-
stakes exams.  Dee and Jacob (2009) find that students in states with no prior accountability policies 
experienced greater increases on the National Assessment of Educational Progress in some grades and 
subjects after NCLB was introduced.  
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3.  Data and Descriptive Analysis 
3.1 Data Description 
Our analysis focuses on the initial years of NCLB implementation following its passage in 
January 2002.  To measure NCLB pressure faced by schools during these years (and which subgroups and 
subjects caused that pressure), our analysis requires a comprehensive, national database of schools’ 
NCLB-related outcomes.  Because NCLB did not require states to report these data to the federal 
government, we painstakingly collected them from individual school report cards or state-level data files 
wherever available, and supplemented remaining states’ data with two existing but incomplete public 
datasets.
5  We present the categories of data collected and their sources in Appendix 1.   
We examine teacher-level outcomes from the 2003-2004 wave of the SASS and student-level 
outcomes from the spring 2004 wave of the ECLS, when most students in the ECLS were in the fifth 
grade.  These surveys are sponsored and distributed by the National Center for Education Statistics.  We 
use the non-public-use versions of these data in order to link teachers and students to our constructed 
measures of the degree to which NCLB placed short-term pressure on their school to make AYP.   
The SASS surveyed teachers in all 50 states and allows researchers to construct nationally-
representative samples with the use of sampling weights.
6  For consistency with our examination of 
student outcomes in the ECLS, we limit the sample of teachers to those working in regular public schools 
that served at least five fifth graders as of 2001-2002.  The first panel of Table 1 provides summary 
statistics on the outcome variables we create from SASS survey questions.
7    
The ECLS followed students for nine years, collecting data in both the fall and the spring of the 
school years 1998-1999 and 1999-2000 (kindergarten and first grade), and in the spring of the school 
years 2001-2002, 2003-2004, and 2006-2007 (third grade, fifth grade, and eighth grade).  The ECLS has 
                                                 
5 These two sources of NCLB-related data are the Council of Chief State of School Officers’ School Data Direct 
(http://www.schooldatadirect.org/) and the American Institutes for Research National AYP and Identification 
Database (http://www.air.org/publications/naypi.data.download.aspx).  Whereas the first source includes AYP data 
in most states for the years 2002-2003 through the current year, the latter dataset includes states’ yes/no 
determinations regarding 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 subgroups and schools’ passage of AYP participation and 
proficiency targets.  In addition to missing data for some states, these sources also contain discrepancies with states’ 
school report cards.  We prioritized school report card data where available since they are the final interface between 
schools and the public and should reflect final adjustments such as school appeals to states' determinations of AYP. 
6 The SASS surveyed administrators but we did not feel these questions were relevant to NCLB pressure.  Although 
the ECLS surveyed teachers, the SASS offers a much larger sample size, surveys teachers across all grades levels, 
and asks them pertinent survey questions about their time use, attitudes toward their job, and future career plans. 
7 We recoded teachers' reported work-related hours and instructional hours as missing if their reported 60 or more 
instructional hours, a suspiciously high level of reported instructional time given the typical five day school week.  
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the widest coverage and array of student-level outcomes of any nationally representative longitudinal 
dataset covering years before and after the passage of NCLB.  Indeed, the timing of the ECLS survey is 
serendipitous, as this cohort was tested just prior to the first year of NCLB and again two years later.  The 
ECLS sample was designed to be representative of kindergartners, their classrooms, and their schools in 
the school year 1998-1999, (and representative of first grade students in 1999-2000).  It includes students 
from 40 relatively populous states.
8   
The student-level data collection procedures in the ECLS result in samples of students that are not 
necessarily representative of the student populations at their schools, particularly due to tracking 
procedures for students making non-structural school transfers.
9  In our analysis of ECLS data, we use 
sampling weights to make our estimates nationally representative.  However, we test the robustness of our 
results to dropping child-level sampling weights and removing students who made non-structural 
enrollment changes.  This alternative specification does not change our main conclusions and has small 
effects on the precision of our estimates, increasing precision in some cases and reducing it in others.  
In the ECLS data, we are particularly interested in measures of student performance on a series of 
standardized tests in math, reading, and science.  Unlike the tests that states administer under NCLB, the 
ECLS tests were low-stakes, un-timed, and adaptive (i.e., subsequent questions are selected based on a 
student’s performance on preceding questions), thus preventing floor or ceiling effects and increasing test 
reliability.  Students and schools became involved in the ECLS survey well before NCLB, and likely 
were familiar with the ECLS surveyors and understood that these tests were not high-stakes.  This reduces 
concerns about teaching to the ECLS test or strategic responses to survey questions.  Also, by examining 
tests unrelated to NCLB, we avoid problems of mean reversion due to measurement error or other shocks 
to high-stakes test scores that do not reflect real achievement but would nevertheless affect the 
accountability pressure faced by the school.  
                                                 
8 It used a multistage probability sample design, first selecting broad geographic areas (e.g., a county), then schools 
within each area, and finally students within schools.  On average, 23 kindergarteners were sampled in each school.   
9 The ECLS includes students who were retained within the same grade or skipped a grade level, but has some 
attrition.  In the school year 1999-2000, a randomly-selected 50 percent sub-sample of students who transferred 
from their original school was surveyed, and another random sample of first graders in the same schools where 
transfer students were followed was added.  However, this “freshening” of the sample was not repeated in the third, 
fifth, and eighth grades, and the ECLS simply sampled 50 percent of students who transferred schools for non-
structural reasons (i.e., students who switched schools for reasons other than moving from a K-4
th grade school to a 
5
th-8
th grade school in the same district).     
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The second panel of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our ECLS outcome measures.  
Since most surveyed students in the ECLS spring 2004 wave were fifth graders, we limit the sample of 
students to those attending regular public schools in the spring of the school year 2003-2004 that also 
served at least five fifth grade students as of 2001-2002.  We standardize students’ scores within subject 
and year so that the national mean score equals zero and the national standard deviation equals one.
10  In 
additional to standardized exams, we examine students’ reported enjoyment of math and reading, as well 
as reported anxiety over standardized tests.
11   
  Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on control variables used in our regression analyses.  We 
show statistics separately for our samples of public school teachers from the SASS and public school 
students from the ECLS.  Along with variables from the surveys themselves, we also use school 
characteristics from the Common Core of Data (CCD), compiled by the National Center for Education 
Statistics (NCES),
 and aggregated student test performance variables from the National Longitudinal 
School-Level State Assessment Score Database (compiled by American Institutes for Research).
12  We 
standardize test performance variables within states to have a mean of zero and standard deviation one.   
In addition to our analysis of the SASS and ECLS data, we examine a set of survey responses 
from the Implementing Standards-Based Accountability (ISBA) study, conducted by the RAND 
Corporation.  As part of ISBA, principals and math teachers in three states (Pennsylvania, Georgia, and 
California) were surveyed regarding their views on NCLB-related policies and the implementation of 
these policies in their schools.  While these data are not public, researchers at RAND generously provided 
us with cross-tabulations of survey responses on a number of items, broken down by our measure of 
NCLB pressure.  We discuss our measure of pressure and present the ISBA results in Section 4. 
 
                                                 
10 The ECLS data report t-scores of students’ IRT-based “theta scores,” which are estimates of students’ skill levels. 
These t-scores are already constructed so that the national (cross-sectional) mean equals 50 and the national standard 
deviation equals 10, so we simply subtract 50 from these scores and then divide by 10 to convert them to Z-scores.  
Our sample means and standard deviations for these variables are not exactly equal to 0 and 1, respectively, because 
we must exclude a small fraction of states and schools with missing data, and because we use longitudinal student 
sample weights rather than cross-sectional sample weights. 
11 Answers to these specific questions, rather than an index based on a larger set of items, were obtained via special 
application to the National Center for Education Statistics.  Due to copyright restrictions we cannot report the exact 
wording of these questions.  For interest in and enjoyment of math and reading, we create dependent variables by 
summing the subject-specific numeric values for four relevant questions.  We use only one question regarding 
feelings of test anxiety and create an indicator for reporting that such feelings were “mostly” or “very” true. 
12 Tennessee did not report school level demographic information to the federal government after 1998-1999.  
Rather than drop Tennessee from our analysis, we use data from 1998-1999 in lieu of data from 2001-2002.  
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3.2 Descriptive Analysis of AYP Outcomes under NCLB 
For a school to make AYP, each of its numerically significant student subgroups must meet a test 
proficiency rate threshold in both math and reading in addition to a test participation cutoff of 95 percent.  
Secondary schools must also meet thresholds for graduation rates, and primary schools must also perform 
sufficiently well on a state-selected “additional indicator,” typically the attendance rate.  Beyond these 
general parameters, states have a great deal of flexibility in setting a number of other rules and 
regulations.  Specifically, states must:  
  select standardized tests in math, reading, and (starting in 2007-2008) science; 
  select which grade levels to test (until 2005-2006)
 13; 
  establish proficiency rate thresholds, i.e., the percent of students that must score proficient or 
higher. Thresholds apply to the whole school as well as individual subgroups; 
  determine whether to calculate proficiency rates using all students across tested grade levels 
within each school or within tested grade levels;
14 
  determine whether to calculate subgroup proficiency rates using multiple years of testing; 
  define continuous enrollment, where only continuously enrolled students count towards 
calculation of subgroup size as well as test participation and proficiency rates; 
  select the minimum number of students that must be enrolled in tested grade levels for a student 
subgroup to be numerically significant and thus count towards a school’s AYP determination; 
  determine the generosity of confidence intervals applied to student subgroups’ raw proficiency 
rates, which effectively lower proficiency thresholds needed to make AYP; 
  determine the nature of safe harbor provisions that allow schools to make AYP in spite of a 
subgroup not meeting the required proficiency rate that year; and, 
  decide upon the appeals process for schools to appeal their AYP status from the state. 
                                                 
13 From 2003 to 2005, states were allowed to choose which tested grade levels counted towards AYP determination, 
so long as at least one level in each of three grade spans (3-5, 6-9, and 10-12) were included.  Only beginning in 
2005-2006 did states have to assess the math and reading proficiency of all third through eighth graders and at least 
one level for grades 10 to 12. 
14 While most states determine subgroup size using students across all tested grades within a school, eight states 
(Arizona, Colorado, Maine, New York, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Washington) further disaggregate 
subgroup size and subgroup results to the grade or grade span level.  
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Even this long list does not fully capture all the minutiae of NCLB rulemaking.  For example, 
while most states consider the performance of five ethnic subgroups (Asian/Pacific Islander, black, 
Hispanic, Native American, and white) in their AYP determinations, California and Alaska add additional 
subgroups (Filipino and Alaskan Native, respectively) while Asian/Pacific Islander is not an AYP 
subgroup in Texas.    
These seemingly esoteric decisions have real implications for whether schools fail to meet the 
targets set for them under NCLB, as can be seen in the remarkable amount of variation in the fraction of 
schools in each state that made AYP.  In 2003, most states' failure rates fell between 20 and 40 percent, 
but the range extended from roughly 1 percent in Iowa to 82 percent in Florida (see Figure 1).   
Importantly for our study, variation in the fraction of schools making AYP was mostly a function 
of states’ rulemaking choices and bears little relation to measures of statewide academic achievement.  
For example, the fraction of schools failing to make AYP by state is not significantly correlated with the 
fraction of students in the state deemed proficient on the state’s own exams, because required proficiency 
rates were often set at the 20
th percentile of baseline (spring 2002) school performance.
15  More 
importantly, as shown in Figure 2, there is little relationship between the fraction of schools failing to 
make AYP in a state and the state’s average student achievement as measured on the National Assessment 
of Educational Progress (NAEP), a federal exam that has been administered to nationally representative 
samples of students in grades 4 and 8 for several decades.
16  States with the highest NAEP proficiency 
rates have slightly lower AYP failure rates than other states, but this relationship is not statistically 
significant and NAEP proficiency rates explain very little of the cross-state variation in AYP failure rates.   
We have been unable to find any single aspect of NCLB design that can explain the wide 
variation in failure rates.  However, by testing a number of factors we have come to the conclusion that 
interaction of four features significantly influences the fraction of schools failing AYP: (1) state rules for 
the numerical significance of student subgroups; (2) within-school heterogeneity, which influences how 
many student subgroups are numerically significant; (3) the generosity of the state’s confidence intervals; 
and (4) the generosity of the state’s safe harbor provisions.  The complex manner in which these policy 
                                                 
15 However, there was even wide variation in how states calculated the 20
th percentile.  For example, some states 
based the 20
th percentile measure on baseline school-wide pass rates and some used grade-specific and/or subject-
specific baseline pass rates. 
16 Note that we plot AYP failure rates for schools serving fifth grade students, which is the type of schools we 
analyze in SASS and ECLS. In Figure 1, AYP failure rates are shown for all schools that receive AYP designations.  
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details interact increases our confidence that the wide differences in the apparent leniency of NCLB 
requirements across states can help identify its impact on schools and students. 
  
4.  Predicting the Probability of Failing AYP 
In the first stage of our analysis, we use our newly assembled data set to determine which student 
subgroups and, by extension, which schools were on the margin of failing to make AYP in the first two 
years during which NCLB was in effect.  We begin by estimating state- and subject-specific probit 
regressions to generate predictions of the likelihood that each numerically-significant student subgroup 
would pass AYP proficiency targets in the spring of both 2003 and 2004.  To do so, we use school 
demographic characteristics (listed in Table 2) and 2001-2002 subgroup-level/school-level test 
performance variables from the school year 2001-2002—after the passage of NCLB but prior to the first 
AYP determinations.
17  We conduct regressions separately by state, so that coefficients capture the 
nuances of how states' NCLB rules affect schools' chances of making AYP.  Regressions are run at the 
student subgroup level and are restricted to those that were numerically significant in either 2003 or 
2004.
18  Because of the variation in NCLB rules across states, our variables differ somewhat across some 
states.  To be as consistent as possible, we applied a set of rules (described in Appendix 2) for how to 
specify our regressions conditional on the available data.  
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where AYPjks03-04 denotes whether subgroup k at school j met its AYP proficiency rate targets in 2003 and 
2004 in subject s.  Xjks02 is a vector of test score variables for subgroup k based on performance on 
statewide exams in subject s during the school year 2001-2002, Njks04 is a vector of student subgroup size 
                                                 
17 In the vast majority of states, student test performance during the 2001-2002 school year did not directly affect the 
proficiency rates used to formulate schools’ AYP determinations during 2002-2003 or 2003-2004.  A few states 
incorporated 2001-2002 proficiency rates into 2002-2003 AYP determinations by generating two-year or three-year 
average proficiency rates for student subgroups; the remaining states used contemporaneous proficiency rates.  Most 
states calculated a "safe harbor" provision whereby a school could make AYP if the only subgroup not meeting its 
target proficiency rate demonstrated sufficient improvement from the prior year. In 2002-2003, this would be based 
on performance relative to 2001-2002. 
18 This means a single school will have as many AYP predictions per subject (math or reading) as it has numerically 
significant student subgroups.  For states that further disaggregate subgroup results to the grade or grade span level, 
we also define subgroups at this disaggregated level.    
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variables in subject s for subgroup k in 2004, XNjks represents interactions of test score and subgroup size 
variables, Wj02 is a vector of control variables for school-level demographics from the school year 2001-
2002 (listed in Table 2), and 04 03 jks M   is a vector of two dichotomous indicators for whether student 
subgroup j was numerically significant in subject s in only 2002-2003 or only 2003-2004, and ζjks is a 
normally distributed disturbance term.  The Xjks02 vector includes cubic terms for the test performance in 
subject s among students in subgroup k at school j.
19  The subgroup size variables (Njks04) and interactions 
with test score measures (XNjks) are included to account for states’ confidence interval adjustments and 
the mechanical decrease in the error variance of student pass rates as the number of tested students within 
subgroup k increases.  In particular, the Njks04 vector contains cubic terms for the inverse of the square root 
of the number of accountable test-taking students in subject s in subgroup k in school j during the school.  
We exclude subgroups from our sample if they were too small to be accountable under AYP in both 2003 
and 2004.  Appendix 2 provides detailed descriptions of each predictor and its data source. 
  We restrict our sample to schools that were (a) operational from at least 2001-2002 through 2003-
2004, (b) neither technical/vocational nor only for special education students according to the 
classifications in the Common Core of Data and (c) served at least five students in grade 5 as of the 
school year 2001-2002.
20  We are forced to omit nine states from the SASS sample and five states from 
the ECLS sample due to missing data (e.g., 2002 test scores or a state’s AYP determinations for 
subgroups).  Our numerous attempts at gathering these data from state departments of education have 
either been unsuccessful or, in most cases, states claim that the data simply do not exist or are too 
                                                 
19 Because we focus on schools serving fifth grade, we prioritize using fifth grade students’ 2001-2002 proficiency 
rates for these control variables.  Because some states either did not test fifth graders in 2001-2002 or disaggregated 
2002-2003/2003-2004 subgroup AYP status by grade level, the 2001-2002 test performance variables are in some 
cases based either in part or wholly on tests from other grades, typically grade 4 or grade 6; full details are provided 
in Appendix 2.  In addition, subgroup-specific performance for 2001-2002 is unavailable for some states, in which 
case we use overall student test performance in subject s, and include interaction terms between test performance 
and the fraction of the overall student population at each school comprised of students in group k.  In practice, we 
find that subgroup-specific and overall measures of pre-NCLB test score performance work equally well in 
predicting the likelihood that the schools’ pass rates will be near the NCLB required cutoff in 2003-2004.   
20 We use the restriction of having five fifth graders because some schools that should serve grade 5 according to 
grade level ranges indicated in the CCD actually enrolled no fifth graders.  In cases where we use test performance 
from a grade other than grade 5 in the Xjks02 vector, the regressions also include subgroups from schools serving the 
tested grade even if the school does not serve grade 5.  For example, if a state tested fourth graders but not fifth 
graders in 2001-2002, we use grade 4 test performance in Xjks02 and include K-4 schools in our first stage.  Full 
details are provided in Appendix 2.  
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unreliable to release.  Fortunately, these states have relatively small populations; more than 92 percent of 
the U.S. population resides in one of the 41 states with sufficient data for our analyses. 
 
4.1 Defining the AYP Margin 
We use predicted subgroup-level AYP pass probabilities from the state- and subject-specific 
regressions in Equation 4 to construct measures of accountability pressure under NCLB.  Our measures 
are based on the following logic.  Schools where all numerically significant subgroups have high chances 
of passing state proficiency targets in both math and reading likely faced little NCLB pressure.  In 
contrast, schools where any numerically significant subgroup was close to the margin of passing are likely 
to have faced accountability pressure.  However, schools where any subgroup has a very low probability 
of passing are unlikely to be able to do anything to change their AYP outcome in the short term.   
Following this logic, we construct the following school level measures of NCLB pressure:  
 
(i)  A school is classified as above the AYP margin if all numerically significant subgroups have 
a high chance of making AYP in both math and reading; 
(ii)  A school is classified as below the AYP margin if it has at least one numerically significant 
subgroup with a low chance of making AYP in either math or reading; 
(iii)  A school is classified as on the AYP margin for a particular subject if (a) at least one 
numerically significant subgroup in the school has a moderate chance of making AYP in that 
subject, and (b) no numerically significant subgroup in the school has a low chance of 
making AYP in either subject;   
(iv)  A school is classified as on the AYP margin if it is on the AYP margin for math or reading.  
  For all of our analyses below, we define a “moderate chance” of a subgroup making AYP as 
between 25 and 75 percent, a “high chance” as above 75 percent, and a “low chance” as less than 25 
percent.  While these cutoffs are admittedly ad hoc, our results are not very sensitive to using other 
cutoffs ranging from between 35 and 65 percent to between 15 and 85 percent.   
Table 3 summarizes our measures of NCLB pressure for schools in these 41 states.  We classify 
69.1 percent of schools above the AYP margin, 21.4 percent on the AYP margin, and 9.5 percent below 
the AYP margin.  The actual rates with which schools made AYP in both 2003 and 2004 were 87 percent 
for schools above the margin, 38 percent for schools on the margin, and 7 percent for schools below the 
margin, demonstrating that our specification has sufficient power to identify substantial variation in which  
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schools were at risk of failing to make AYP.  However, our analyses below are predicated on the idea that 
the risks of AYP failure were foreseeable to school administrators and teachers.  To the extent that 
measurement error causes us to misclassify which schools believed they were on the AYP margin, our 
estimated effects of NCLB pressure may be biased towards zero.  This possibility motivates the need to 
examine whether our estimates are related to teachers’ and administrators’ reported sense of 
accountability pressure, which we do below. 
  The results reported in Table 3 also reveal that, with the exception of white and economically 
disadvantaged students, most student subgroups were typically not numerically significant and did not 
count towards AYP.  For example, 70 percent of schools did not have a sufficient number of disabled 
(special education) students in either 2003 or 2004 to be held accountable for that group’s performance.  
This rate varied across states depending on minimum subgroup size requirements, again underscoring the 
importance of these regulations.  For example, disabled subgroups were accountable under NCLB in 
either 2003 or 2004 in just 7 percent of Arizona schools, compared with 61 percent in Massachusetts.     
  Among subgroups that were numerically significant and thus accountable, the fraction we predict 
to have a moderate or low chance of making AYP varies considerably.  The subgroups most frequently 
predicted to have a moderate chance of passing in reading were disabled and limited English proficient 
(30 and 37 percent, respectively) and, in math, disabled and Black (26 and 27 percent, respectively).  
Disabled student subgroups also have relatively high fractions (about 15 percent) predicted to have low 
chances of passing proficiency targets in both subjects, as do Native American subgroups (17 percent in 
math, 22 percent in reading) and Asian subgroups in reading (25 percent).  In contrast, White subgroups 
are nearly always predicted to have a high chance of passing proficiency targets.   
 
4.2 Variation in Predicted NCLB Pressure across States 
Our identification strategy is predicated on the idea that similar schools faced different levels of 
NCLB pressure because of the state in which they were located.  However, it is still broadly true that 
schools with high average achievement had greater chances of making AYP than schools with low 
average achievement.  To illustrate both of these ideas, we take our primary measure of NCLB pressure—
whether a school was on the AYP margin—and plot cumulative distributions of the percent of schools on  
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the margin across 41 states, separating schools by quartile of within-state campus-wide test score 
performance in the school year 2001-2002.   
As expected, we place more schools on the AYP margin within the lowest performance quartile, 
but being on the margin is by no means the exclusive territory of low scoring schools (Figure 3, top 
panel).  The median state has 60 percent of its lowest quartile schools on the AYP margin, but also has 25 
percent of its second quartile, 10 percent of its third quartile, and 5 percent of the top performing quartile 
on the AYP margin.  Importantly, in all of our analyses below, we always include flexible controls for 
schools’ relative performance on statewide examinations in the school year 2001-2002.  Thus, our 
identification is not based on the general tendency of low-scoring schools to face more NCLB pressure. 
These cumulative distributions also illustrate that we put many relatively high performing schools 
on the AYP margin in some states with “tough” NCLB rules.  In 20 percent of states, the percentages of 
schools on the AYP margin in the lowest through highest performing quartiles were at least 80 percent, 
50 percent, 25 percent, and 10 percent, respectively.  In contrast, for the 20 percent of states that appear to 
have the lowest amount of NCLB pressure, the percentages of schools on the AYP margin in the lowest 
through highest performing quartiles were at most 40, 12, 5, and 3 percent, respectively.   
When we plot similar cumulative distributions for the percentage of schools we place below the 
AYP margin, we see less variation but similar qualitative results (see Figure 3, bottom panel).  As 
expected, far more schools are below the margin in the bottom quartile of school test performance.  
Nevertheless, we place hardly any schools below the margin in a few states, while in some states we place 
a substantial fraction of schools below the margin in the second or third quartiles of within-state 
performance.  In other words, schools with reasonably good test scores still had a low chance of passing 
AYP in some states with “tough” NCLB rules.  
 
4.3 Assessing our Measure of NCLB Pressure in the ISBA Surveys 
To get an initial sense of the validity of our measures of NCLB pressure, we examine aggregate 
statistics from surveys of principals and math teachers in California, Pennsylvania, and Georgia by the 
RAND Corporation concerning topics related to NCLB in the school-year 2003-2004.  As mentioned in 
Section 3, the micro data from these surveys are not publicly available and we present these cross-
tabulations as suggestive evidence.  We pursue a more rigorous methodology in Section 5.   
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We are only able to examine principals’ survey responses in 21 schools that we classified as on 
the AYP margin and 104 schools above the AYP margin. No principals were surveyed at any school that 
we predict had a low chance of making AYP.  Among principals working in schools above the AYP 
margin, 96 percent felt they would make AYP in the school year 2003-2004, relative to only 71 percent 
who worked in schools on the AYP margin.  Indeed, among principals in schools above the AYP margin, 
72 percent felt they would make AYP for the next five years, relative to only 48 percent in the marginal 
group (Table 4, Panel A).  Principals in schools on the AYP margin were between 9 and 14 percentage 
points more likely to say that they had: encouraged teachers to focus more time on tested subjects; 
distributed commercial test preparation materials; or distributed copies of previous state tests or test 
items.  All of these differences in responses across principals in the two groups are statistically significant 
at approximately the one percent level. 
Because of the larger number of teachers surveyed, we can examine teachers working in schools 
we classify as below the margin (19 teachers), on the margin (224 teachers), and above the margin (1,074 
teachers) of AYP.  Relevant survey questions included probes about teaching test-taking strategies, 
focusing on students who are close to proficient on the high stakes test, emphasizing the topics and types 
of problems given on the state test, spending more time teaching content, and searching for more effective 
teaching methods.  Teachers working in schools on the AYP margin were between 11 and 19 percentage 
points more likely than teachers working in schools above the AYP margin to report having taken these 
actions, while teachers in schools below the AYP margin were between 3 and 20 percentage points more 
likely to report having taken these actions than teachers in schools on the margin.  All of the differences 
between responses from teachers in the schools above the margin and either of the other two teacher 
groups are statistically significant at the one percent level, and help confirm that our constructed measures 
of NCLB pressure align with principals’ and teachers’ reported perceptions. 
 
5.  Estimates of the Impact of Accountability Pressure Under NCLB 
We use our measures of whether a school is below, on, or above the AYP margin to predict 
various outcomes for an individual i (i.e., a student or teacher) in school j and state q.  Our basic 
regression specification is shown by Equation 5: 
(5)  ij j j j j ij q ij X W Q Y               ) n_AYP BelowMargi ( ) Margin_AYP ( 3 02 2 02 1 .  
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Yij is an outcome of interest, q represents state fixed effects, Qij is a vector of (student- or teacher-level) 
control variables, and Wj02 is a vector of school-level control variables (as in Equation 4).  The Xj02 vector 
differs slightly from the Xjks02 vector in Equation 4 in that it contains school-wide student achievement 
measures in reading and math during the school year 2001-2002, normalized within the state to have a 
mean of zero and standard deviation of one, and the square and cube of these achievement measures.   
The coefficient of interest is , which represents the average impact of the NCLB pressure 
associated with being in a school on the AYP margin.  This estimate of  measures the causal effect of 
short-term accountability pressure under the assumption that, conditional on a host of observable school 
characteristics, the variation across states in whether a school falls on the AYP margin is exogenous.  We 
believe that the evidence presented in Section 3 provides ample support for this identification strategy.  
The estimate of (i.e., the impact of NCLB pressure associated with being below the AYP margin) is less 
well-identified and should be interpreted more cautiously, though there are likely very few schools that 
would find themselves below the AYP margin in every state nationwide (see Figure 3).  Nevertheless, 
because few schools are predicted to be below the AYP margin, our estimates of  always remain 
qualitatively similar if we drop the “below margin” indicator ( from the regressions. 
Because our measures of NCLB pressure are derived from first stage probit regressions, we 
estimate standard errors using a two-sample bootstrap adjusted for school-level clustering.  We use 1,000 
Monte Carlo simulations of both the first- and second-stage models, randomly sampling coefficients from 
the first-stage model using the implied distribution from the variance-covariance matrix which allows for 
school clustering, and randomly sampling schools (with replacement) in the second-stage models. 
   
5.1 Impacts on Teachers 
  We examine the effect of NCLB pressure on teachers using the SASS data from 2003-2004.  
Because many of these teachers do not teach students or subjects tested under NCLB, we augment 
Equation 5 with an indicator for whether the teacher taught math or reading in a NCLB-tested grade and 
interact this with the indicators for whether the school was on or below the AYP margin.
21  The Qij vector 
                                                 
21 In cases of teachers covering multiple grades, we set the “high-stakes grade/subject” indicator variable equal to 
one if the teacher covers either math or reading and more than half of the teacher’s covered grade levels were tested 
for NCLB in that teacher’s state during the spring of 2004.  
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includes the teacher-level control variables listed in Table 2, with both linear and squared terms for 
teachers’ years of experience.   
  The first column of Table 5 (Panel A) displays estimated effects of NCLB pressure on whether 
teachers strongly agreed with the statement: “I worry about the security of my job because of the 
performance of my students on state and/or local tests.”  Compared to teachers of high-stakes 
grades/subjects at schools above the AYP margin, those in schools on the AYP margin are 5 percentage 
points more likely to report concern over their job security related to student test performance—a large 
increase considering that only 7.5 percent of teachers reported this concern overall.  Like the ISBA results 
above, this supports the notion that our measure of NCLB pressure is valid and captures significant 
variation in school staff members' perceptions of pressure.  Column 1 in Panel B of Table 5 displays 
estimates from a specification that restricts the sample to untenured teachers.
22  Although the resulting 
drop in the number of observations decreases our precision significantly, we do find that untenured 
teachers working in schools below the AYP margin, even those not teaching high-stakes grades/subjects, 
tend to be very concerned about how student test performance will affect their job security.   
We next examine how NCLB pressure affects teachers' long-term career plans.  We construct an 
indicator variable from teachers’ survey responses concerning whether they plan to teach until retirement.  
If a school is on the AYP margin, untenured teachers are at least as likely to have long-term teaching 
career plans as their counterparts teaching in schools with higher probabilities of making AYP.  However, 
teachers working in high-stakes grades/subjects in a school below the AYP margin are 13 percentage 
points less likely to plan to teach until retirement than those working in a school above the AYP margin 
(Table 5, Panel A, Column 2).  This is in line with findings by Feng et al. (2010) that schools in Florida 
that received very low accountability ratings subsequently experienced higher rates of teacher turnover.  
The effect is stronger for untenured teachers (Table 5, Panel B, Column 2), suggesting that teachers at 
greatest risk of job loss might be discouraged by the challenge of raising student proficiency rates at 
schools that are unlikely to make AYP and face state sanctions.   
The third column of Table 5 presents results concerning how NCLB pressure affects teachers' 
total weekly work hours, measured several months ahead of NCLB testing.  The largest and most 
                                                 
22 The SASS does not measure tenure, so we created an indicator for whether a teacher’s total years of experience 
(measured in the SASS) exceeds the state’s required number of years for tenure.  Data on state requirements come 
from 2002-2003, see Brunner and Imazeki (forthcoming), and we thank Eric Brunner for providing them.  
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significant differences in work hours occur for untenured teachers who work in high-stakes areas at 
schools on the AYP margin.  These teachers report working about four hours more per week than their 
untenured co-workers teaching low-stakes grades/subjects at their schools, a difference with a p-value of 
0.03.
23  Given that the standard deviation of work hours is under 10 hours (see Table 1), this difference in 
hours worked by untenured teachers is substantial.   
We also estimate the impact of NCLB pressure on teachers' self-reported number of instructional 
hours per week, which is a subset of their total work hours.  Unlike total hours, instructional hours do not 
increase for any type of teacher in response to NCLB pressure (Table 5, Column 4).  Moreover, 
instructional hours actually decline by one to two hours per week for teachers in schools below the AYP 
margin and for untenured teachers in schools on the AYP margin, though not differentially for those 
teaching high-stakes grades/subjects.  The fact that untenured teachers in schools facing short-term NCLB 
pressure report working more hours but spending less time on instruction presumably means that part of 
their work day shifts towards other activities such as student assessment, grading, lesson planning, or 
other non-instructional activities.  This heightens the concern that NCLB pressure may have negative 
effects on student achievement, particularly for material not covered on high-stakes exams, and provides 
further motivation for our analysis of student outcomes via the ECLS data. 
In the SASS data, surveyed teachers are randomly selected within each school, so their activities 
should be an unbiased (albeit noisy) measure for all teachers in the school.  Nevertheless, one concern for 
our analysis is that principals at schools facing NCLB pressure strategically place teachers into high-
stakes grades and subjects.  However, we believe such behavior would most likely create bias against our 
findings.  If principals wish to boost high-stakes test performance, they should assign their most talented 
teachers to high-stakes areas.  Yet we find these teachers are more concerned about their job security, are 
less likely to plan to teach until retirement, and work longer hours only if they do not have tenure. 
While the SASS data are too coarse to identify the specific activities to which teachers devote 
more time, we can explore shifts in instructional time across subject areas using self-reports of teaching 
content during the previous week.  The SASS surveyed teachers in the fall, well ahead of NCLB testing, 
                                                 
23 We computed the p-value of this estimate using the bootstrapped standard error for the sum of the relevant 
coefficients.  The 3.07 point estimate for the interaction of teaching high-stakes with working in a school on the 
AYP margin is marginally significant, with a p-value of .11, suggesting that high-stakes teachers in schools under 
accountability pressure also work longer hours than high-stakes teachers in schools facing little pressure under 
NCLB.    
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and survey responses should reflect general shifts in instruction rather than last-minute preparation for 
high-stakes tests.  To examine whether NCLB pressure shifted resources away from low-stakes subjects, 
we focus on whether the teacher taught at least one science lesson or at least one social studies lesson 
during the prior week.  The estimates displayed in Table 6 suggest that schools on the AYP margin 
slightly change the proportion of teachers offering science lessons.  Compared to teachers at schools 
above the margin, these teachers are 4.0 percentage points less likely to have taught a science lesson in 
the last week.  They are also 1.3 percentage points less likely to have taught a social science lesson, but 
this estimate is not statistically significant.  The effects on science and social studies offerings in schools 
below the AYP margin are even larger and both statistically significant.  Compared to teachers at schools 
above the margin, teachers in schools with a low chance of making AYP are 10 percentage points less 
likely to offer a science lesson and 6 percentage points less likely to offer a social studies lesson.  These 
are large differences considering that 63 percent and 65 percent of teachers in this sample taught science 
and social studies lessons, respectively, in the previous week (see Table 1).  Schools with little short-term 
chance of making AYP may still try to shift instruction toward the high-stakes subjects in order increase 
their chances of eventually making AYP.
 24 
  
5.2 Impacts on Students  
  Changes in teachers’ work and instructional time measured in the SASS data provide somewhat 
ambiguous evidence on whether NCLB pressure leads to broad increases in student achievement or a 
more narrow focus on the material included on high-stakes tests.  We address this issue directly using the 
ECLS data.  Our student-level regression specifications are based on Equation 5, and control for all of the 
variables listed in Table 2 as well as state fixed effects and a third degree polynomial of the student's 
standardized math and reading performance in both the first and third grade waves of the ECLS.  Thus, 
our identification comes only from comparing students with very similar prior learning trajectories who 
attend schools with similar demographic and academic characteristics but different levels of NCLB 
pressure because of the state in which they are located. 
                                                 
24 A reduction in science and social studies lessons could be driven by schools using specialists who teach intensive 
amounts of science and social studies to compensate for decreased lessons from other instructors.  However, if we 
examine hours taught in science or social studies conditional on teaching at least one lesson in the subject we find no 
support for this explanation.     
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Panel I of Table 7 displays coefficient estimates for our indicator of whether a school was on the 
AYP margin.
25  Estimated coefficients for our indicator that a school is below the AYP margin were never 
even marginally significant and are not reported for ease of exposition.  Our estimates suggest that NCLB 
pressure has either neutral or positive effects on student achievement in both low- and high-stakes 
subjects.  Students' reading scores are .073 of a standard deviation greater on average when schools are on 
the AYP margin (Table 7, Panel I, Column 1).  This estimate is statistically significant at the .05 level and 
is a considerably large effect; previous estimates of the impact of accountability pressure on high-stakes 
tests are typically between 0.1 and 0.2 standard deviations (e.g., Rouse et al., 2007; Rockoff and Turner, 
2010).  Students' math scores are 0.043 of a standard deviation greater on average when they attend a 
school that is on the AYP margin, though this estimate is not statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level.  Science scores are also greater (0.049 of a standard deviation), though again this estimate is not 
statistically significant.  Although we are examining results for multiple dependent variables, a power test 
suggests that these three estimates are far too large to occur by chance.
26  
Importantly, our results also suggest that when schools face NCLB pressure, gains in 
achievement do not decrease students’ enjoyment of reading or math, or increase anxiety over testing. 
Respective point estimates for the impact of NCLB pressure on students' enjoyment of reading and math 
are -0.031 standard deviations (statistically insignificant) and 0.148 standard deviations (significant at the 
5 percent level).  We also find a small and statistically insignificant decrease of 0.05 standard deviations 
in students’ reported anxiety over testing. 
  The framework presented in Section 2 motivates the idea that the impacts of NCLB may differ 
across students within a school.  We first examine whether our estimates depend on whether schools 
faced strong pressure to raise proficiency rates for the overall student population or for the focal student's 
own subgroup(s).  Estimates presented in Panel II come from specifications where we replace the single 
"on the AYP margin" variable with three mutually exclusive indicators for whether the school was on the 
AYP margin due to: (1) the overall student group, (2) the student's own subgroup (and not the overall 
                                                 
25 We focus on the AYP margin for most relevant subject(s): math for math test performance or enjoyment, reading 
for reading test performance or enjoyment, and either math or reading for science test performance or anxiety about 
standardized tests.  We lack power to separate relevant-subject and cross-subject effects using the ECLS.   
26 To test the joint significance of these test score estimates, we simulated estimations of these three models after 
randomly reassigning schools to different AYP status.  Out of 1,000 simulations, none produced three estimates that 
were, respectively, at least as large in absolute value of as the actual highest, second highest and third highest 
estimate reported in the first three columns of Panel I of Table 7.   
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student group as well), and (3) other subgroups (and not the student's own subgroup or the overall student 
group).  The point estimates for all three subjects in Panel II are positive, regardless of whether the 
students are members of subgroups whose performance is most critical to the schools' AYP ratings, and 
the relative magnitudes of the three coefficients are different across the three subject areas.  Thus, we find 
no systematic patterns suggesting that our results are driven by targeting particular student subgroups.
27   
  To produce the largest increase in student proficiency rates, schools might also direct resources to 
students who are likely to score close to the threshold of passing the exam.  Previous studies find 
evidence of distributional effects on student achievement on high-stakes exams (e.g., Reback, 2008; Neal 
and Whitmore Schanzenbach, 2010), and we provide evidence here concerning distributional effects on 
low-stakes exams.  We classify a student as “on the bubble” for passing their state exam if their third 
grade test score was within 15 percentiles below or 5 percentiles above their states' NCLB exam passing 
threshold.
28  The coefficients on the interaction of our indicator for whether a student is "on the bubble" 
and whether the school is on the AYP margin are generally positive but statistically insignificant (Panel 
III of Table 7).  In other words, students on the bubble of passing high-stakes exams do not appear to 
perform differently on low-stakes exams when their schools face strong NCLB pressure, although our 
estimates are too imprecise to rule out small effects.   
 
6.  Conclusion  
As a result of the No Child Left Behind act, virtually every public school in the U.S. is now 
accountable for meeting measured targets for student test performance, yet our understanding of the 
impact of NCLB has been hindered by a lack of national data on implementation and nationally 
comparable data on outcomes.  Assembling an extensive national data set of school and student subgroup 
                                                 
27 Of course, it is still possible that schools facing NCLB pressure target resources toward subgroups in ways that 
affect performance on high-stakes tests.  However, the highly reliable examinations in the ECLS provide some 
assurance that NCLB pressure does not systematically lead to adverse achievement outcomes for students with more 
or less influence on whether the school makes AYP. 
28 The National Center for Education Statistics (2007) estimates NAEP score equivalents associated with the passing 
threshold for most states' NCLB exams, and we obtained national percentile equivalents for these NAEP scores.  We 
are unable to do this for eight ECLS states that were not included in the National Center for Education Statistics 
(2007) publication.  Using ranges smaller than 20 percentiles would lead to highly imprecise estimates, and we use a 
wider range below the cutoffs than above the cutoffs because schools may have anticipated their capacity to improve 
student performance over time—i.e., most states experienced upward trends in proficiency rates over the first few 
years of NCLB.  For reading and math outcomes our indicator is subject specific; for science tests and test anxiety 
we use an indicator for being on the bubble in either math or reading.  
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performance on the examinations required under NCLB, we exploit extensive cross-state variation in 
rules and standards to examine how NCLB affects school personnel and students.  In schools facing 
strong short-term NCLB pressure, we find that teachers report greater concern over how student test 
performance will affect their job security and that untenured teachers in high-stakes grades/subjects work 
longer hours.  We also find evidence that schools which will almost certainly fail state requirements in the 
short term allocate less time to science and social studies instruction, and that untenured teachers in these 
schools feel much lower job security and expect to exit the teaching profession sooner.   
Relative to students in schools facing little NCLB pressure, students in schools facing strong 
short-term incentives to improve student proficiency raise achievement by 0.07 standard deviations on 
low-stakes reading exams, do at least as well on low-stakes math and science tests, do not report less 
enjoyment of reading or math, and do not report more test anxiety.  These results do not differ 
significantly across student subgroups that have differential influence on whether a school fails NCLB 
requirements, nor between students close to the passing threshold and those farther away. 
Our finding that short-term NCLB pressure does not negatively affect student learning or 
enjoyment of learning is quite important, given widely held concerns about the use of test-based 
accountability systems.  On the other hand, our results also raise questions concerning whether NCLB 
pressure motivates both tenured and untenured teachers alike, whether talented teachers are discouraged 
from working in schools with little chance of meeting NCLB requirements, and whether schools neglect 
low-stakes subjects if their performance lags far below NCLB standards.  These issues loom larger every 
year as NCLB standards become more stringent and more schools fail to meet those standards.  As 
Congress is likely to debate revisions to No Child Left Behind in the near future (see Dillon, New York 
Times, 2010), policymakers may wish to ensure that schools along the entire performance spectrum face 
more continuous incentives to improve along a wide array of outcomes.  A revised accountability system 
could offer rewards designed so that incentives are independent of students’ prior achievement levels and 
the scaling of test scores.
29   
Policymakers may also want to consider the large differences in rules and regulations across 
states, which we as researchers use to identify the effects of NCLB pressure on schools. Thus far, the 
                                                 
29 See Barlevy and Neal (2010) for a detailed discussion and analysis of one example of such a system.  They 
propose a system for rating teacher performance, but a similar system could instead be used to assess school 
performance.  
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minutiae of state rules have largely determined the difficulty of meeting AYP.  Although a majority of 
states have adopted "Common Core State Standards" that may increase the consistency of student 
achievement tests across states, most of the current variation in AYP failure rates across states is not 
driven by the difficulty of state exams.  If policymakers would like to establish more uniformity across 
states’ school accountability standards, then reforms must address the other sources of variation within 
state formulae.  Ideally, accountability pressure should stem from the performance of students along the 
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Figure 1: Distribution of AYP Failure Rates Across States, 2003
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Figure 3: State Variation in the Percentage of Schools Facing NCLB Pressure 
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Note: These figures show cumulative distributions of the percentage of schools we consider on the margin of 
making Adequate Yearly Progress (top panel) and below the margin of making Adequate Yearly Progress (bottom 
panel) for 2003 and 2004 for the 41 states in our Schools and Staffing Survey analysis.  Quartiles reflect schools’ 
positions in their own state’s distribution of student test performance during the school year 2001-2002.  
 
 Table 1:  Summary Statistics for Dependent Variables 
 
 Mean  SD 
Teacher-level Dependent Variables from the SASS  
Concerned about Job Security due to Student Test Performance  7.5%  
Plan to Teach Until Retirement   78%   
Work Hours per weekeek
†
  52.4 8.91 
Instructional Hours per weekeek
†
  29.1 5.17 
 
Gave at Least One Science Lesson Last Week  63%  
Gave at Least One Social Studies Lesson Last Week  65% 
 
 
Untenured Teachers Only:    
   Concerned about Job Security due to Student Test Performance   11%  
   Plan to Teach Until Retirement   73%  
   Work Hours per week
†
  53.8 9.46 
   Instructional Hours per week
†
  29.5 5.40 
    
Student-level Dependent Variables from the ECLS    
5th Grade Reading Score (Standardized)  .009  .967 
5th Grade Math Score (Standardized)  .028  .982 
5th Grade Science Score (Standardized)  .081  .950 
Enjoyment of Reading (Standardized)  -.002  1.01 
Enjoyment of Math (Standardized)  .037  1.01 
Anxiety about standardized tests   42%   
 
Notes to Table 1: Means and standard deviations using relevant sample weights provided by the SASS and ECLS to 
produce nationally representative estimates.  The sample is restricted to observations used in the main analyses: 
teachers in 41 states for the SASS sample and students in 35 states in the ELCS sample.  The sample sizes are 
approximately 7,870 teachers for the SASS sample (1,440 for untenured teachers only) and approximately 6,860 
students for the ECLS sample, (rounded to the nearest 10 due to restricted-use data reporting requirements).  
Standardized variables are Z-scores that were standardized based on the national, cross-sectional student 
distribution; their means and standard deviations above differ from zero and one respectively because some 
states/students are omitted due to missing data and because we use longitudinal sampling weights rather than cross-
sectional sampling weights.   
†We set teachers' work-related hours and instructional hours to missing if their reported instructional hours were 60 
hours or greater, a suspiciously high level of reported instructional time given the typical five day school week.  The 
work hours per week variable is based on teachers’ self-reported hours spent on “all teaching and other school-
related activities during a typical full week.” 
  
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables 
         SASS Sample     ECLS Sample 
Variable  Mean SD    Mean  SD
  School characteristics         
  Within-state Z-score for 2001-2002 Reading  0.007  0.949     0.125  0.957 
  Within-state Z-score for 2001-2002 Math  0.043  0.925     0.100  0.960 
   Eligible for Title I  69%       60%    
   Number of enrolled students  587  258    587  251 
   Percent Asian students  4%  9%    5%  10% 
   Percent Hispanic students  19%  28%    16%  24% 
   Percent African American students  18%  26%    19%  26% 
   Percent economically disadvantaged students  47%  30%    44%  30% 
   Number LEP students in the grade        5  13 
   Missing Number of LEP students in the grade        14%    
   Teacher characteristics (from the SASS)            
  Total years of experience  13.9  10.1       
  Teaches Math  77%         
  Teaches Reading (or English)  83%         
  Teaches a high-stakes subject/grade  34%         
   Teaches grades 2 or 3  41%           
   Teaches grades 4 or 5  42%           
   Teaches grades 6 or 7  14%           
   Teaches grades 8 or 9  7%           
   Teaches grade 10 or higher  3%           
   Teaches grades 2 or 3 and grades 4 or 5  15%           
   Teaches grades 4 or 5 and grades 6 or 7  7%           
   Teaches grades 6 or 7 and grades 8 or 9  5%           
   Teaches grades 8 or 9 and grade 10 or higher  2%           
  Family characteristics (from the ECLS)           
   Two parent household        67%    
   Mother's education level unknown        9%    
   Mother has at least a high school diploma        89%    
   Mother possesses a B.A.        31%    
   Family income missing        16%    
   Family income under $20,000        15%    
   Family income $20,000 -$35,000        18%    
   Family income $35,000 - $50,000        14%    
   Family income $50,000 - $75,000        14%    
   Family income $75,000 - $100,000        11%    
  Student characteristics (from the ECLS)           
   Reading Z-score in spring 2000        0.017  0.950 
   Math Z-score in spring 2000        0.029  0.919 
   Reading Z-score score in spring 2002        -0.001  0.981 
   Math Z-score in spring 2002        0.029  0.970 
   African American        18%    
   Hispanic      20%    
   Asian      3%    
   Other      5%    
   Female      48%    
   Date of birth (measured in days)        3/18/93  140 
N = approximately 7,870 teachers for the SASS sample and approximately 6,860 students for the ECLS sample.   
  
 
Table 3: Predictions of AYP Outcomes                            
Panel A: School-wide Outcomes                            
   On the AYP Margin    Below the AYP Margin     Above the AYP Margin 
Percent of Schools  21.4%     9.5%     69.1% 
  Percent Actually Made AYP 2003 and 2004  37.9%     7.4%     86.5% 
 Panel B: Subgroup Outcomes        Conditional on Numerical Significance 
   Numerically Significant 
Subgroup 
   Predicted Moderate Chance     Predicted Low Chance 
      Math     Reading     Math     Reading 
Overall School Population  92.8%     7.2%     9.0%     2.1%     2.5% 
    Actually made AYP in subject in '03 and '04        51.9%     52.4%     10.7%     8.9% 
Economically Disadvantaged  60.5%     14.2%     17.4%     3.7%     4.6% 
    Actually made AYP in subject in '03 and '04        54.0%     53.0%     12.8%     12.7% 
Limited English Proficient  20.0%     18.6%     36.7%     4.8%     10.6% 
    Actually made AYP in subject in '03 and '04        58.3%     49.9%     13.5%     19.5% 
Disabled  30.0%     26.1%     30.0%     13.9%     15.8% 
    Actually made AYP in subject in '03 and '04        52.0%     53.1%     14.1%     12.3% 
White  69.5%     1.2%     0.9%     0.1%     0.0% 
    Actually made AYP in subject in '03 and '04        55.2%     61.5%     15.8%     25.0% 
Black  29.7%     26.9%     23.2%     9.5%     7.8% 
    Actually made AYP in subject in '03 and '04        51.5%     52.5%     16.7%     15.3% 
Hispanic  28.7%     10.9%     18.6%     1.2%     2.7% 
    Actually made AYP in subject in '03 and '04        56.8%     54.6%     13.8%     15.0% 
Asian/Pacific Islander/Filipino  12.3%     0.7%     3.5%     0.0%     25.2% 
    Actually made AYP in subject in '03 and '04        54.6%     53.6%     33.3%     8.8% 
Native American / Alaskan Native  5.9%     14.7%     14.5%     17.1%     22.1% 
    Actually made AYP in subject in '03 and '04        56.7%     52.4%     5.7%     7.3% 
Notes to Table 3: This sample includes all public schools used to estimate Equation 4.  These schools provide 2001-2002 student test performance data for the relevant grade 
level, typically fifth grade. For more details on chosen grade levels, please consult the "Student test performance in focal subject in 2001-2002" row in Appendix 2.   
 
 
Table 4: Evidence on NCLB Pressure from the ISBA Survey in California, Georgia, and Pennsylvania 
   Above   
AYP Margin
(N=104) 
   On 
AYP Margin
 (N=21) 
     
Panel A: Principals          
Do you agree with the following statement:               
   My school can attain the AYP targets for 2003-2004   96.1%     71.4%       
   My school can attain the AYP targets for the next five years  71.6%     47.6%       
Has your school and/or district done any of the following:                
   Encouraged or required teachers to spend more time on tested subjects and less time on other 
subjects   49.0%     61.9%       
   Distributed commercial test preparation materials   67.0%     81.0%       
   Distributed released copies of the state test or test items   76.9%     85.7%       
   Above   
AYP Margin
 (N=1074) 
   On 
AYP Margin
(N=224) 
   Below 
AYP Margin
(N=19)  Panel B: Math Teachers       
As a result of the state mathematics test:                
   I focus more effort on students who are close to proficient   25.9%     41.3%     52.6% 
   I spend more time teaching general test-taking strategies   52.6%     66.7%     73.7% 
   I look for particular styles and formats of problems in the state test and emphasize those in my 
instruction   66.5%     79.9%     100.0% 
   I focus more on topics emphasized in the state test   69.4%     81.3%     84.2% 
   I spend more time teaching content   54.1%     73.4%     79.0% 
   I search for more effective teaching methods  72.7%     83.9%     94.4% 
Notes to Table 4: Percentages shown in this table refer to the percentage of respondents who agreed with the corresponding statement. Above, on, and below 
the AYP margin correspond to our classifications of how likely the school was to make AYP in 2003 and 2004. See Section 4 of the paper for details. No 
principal surveyed was in a school classified by our analysis as below the AYP margin.  All of the differences in rates between the groups above the AYP 
margin and either of the other two groups are statistically significant at approximately the .01 level or better.  Differences in rates between teachers in schools 
above the AYP margin and those in schools on the AYP margin are statistically significant at the .05 level for "I focus more effort on students who are close to 
proficient," and at the .01 level for "I look for particular styles..." and "I search for more effective teaching methods."  
 





Job Security due 
to Student Test 
Performance 




in a Typical 
Week  
Instructional 
Hours in a 
Typical 
Week 
All Teachers                    
On the AYP Margin   -0.011     0.005   0.07      -0.41 
  (.013)   (.024)   (.54)      (.30) 
Below the AYP Margin  0.025     0.004   -1.10      -1.17** 
  (.021)   (.035)   (.84)      (.40) 
Teach High-stakes   0.014     0.008   -0.41      -0.27 
  (.014)   (.024)   (.48)      (.29) 
On the AYP Margin   0.050**    -0.045   -0.03      -0.38 
    *Teach High-stakes  (.024)   (.036)   (.78)      (.45) 
Below the AYP Margin  0.025     -0.128**   1.00      0.23 
   *Teach High-stakes  (.035)   (.046)  (1.02)      (.56) 
                    
Untenured Teachers Only                    
On the AYP Margin  0.017     0.114*  -0.74     -1.93** 
  (.042)   (.059)  (1.44)      (.81) 
Below the AYP Margin  0.124**    0.116   0.04      -2.21** 
  (.061)   (.083)  (2.04)     (1.03) 
Teach High-stakes   0.022     0.096*   0.87      0.19 
  (.043)   (.057)  (1.18)      (.77) 
On the AYP Margin   0.020     -0.089   3.07      0.34 
    *Teach High-stakes  (.064)   (.087)  (1.94)     (1.18) 
Below the AYP Margin   -0.050     -0.286**   2.70      -1.21 
   *Teach High-stakes  (.085)   (.120)  (2.03)     (1.31) 
                 
 
Notes to Table 5:  Each column displays estimates from two separate teacher-level regressions using data from the 
2003-2004 wave of the Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS).  The top panel uses a sample of both tenured and non-
tenured teachers (sample size approximately 7,870), and the bottom panel restricts the sample to untenured teachers 
(sample size approximately 1,440).  Teachers' tenure status is not reported directly in the SASS, so we impute it using 
teachers' reported years of experience and their states' tenure policies (see footnote 24).  All models control for the 
independent variables with summary statistics listed in the "SASS sample" column of Table 2, and also control for state 
fixed effects, for a squared term for the number of Limited English proficient students in the grade, for a squared term 
for the teacher’s years of experience, and for squared and cubic terms for schools' within-state standardized 2001-2002 
test score performance in both math and reading.  All models use the SASS cross-sectional sample weights to make the 
estimates nationally representative.  Bootstrapped standard errors, adjusted for school-level clustering using 1,000 
Monte Carlo simulations of both the first-stage and second-stage models, are displayed in parentheses below each 
estimate. 
 ** significant at .05 level; * significant at .10 level.  
 
Table 6:  NCLB Pressure and Instruction in Low-stakes Subjects 
 
 
Teacher gave at 
least one science 
lesson last week 
  Teacher gave at least 
one social studies 
lesson last week 
On the AYP Margin   -0.040 *   -0.013   
  (.024)    (.021)   
Below the AYP Margin   -0.104 **   -0.062  ** 
  (.038)    (.029)   
 
 
Notes to Table 6:  Each column displays estimates from a teacher-level regression using data from the 2003-2004 wave 
of the Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS).  Sample size is approximately 7,870.  These models control for the 
independent variables with summary statistics listed in the "SASS sample" column of Table 2, except for the indicators 
for whether the teachers covered math or reading and the indicator for whether the teachers covered a high-stakes 
grade/subject.  Similar to Table 5, the models also control for state fixed effects, for a squared term for the number of 
Limited English proficient students in the grade, for a squared term for the teacher’s years of experience, and for 
squared and cubic terms for schools' within-state standardized 2001-2002 test score performance in both math and 
reading.  All models use the SASS cross-sectional sample weights to make the estimates nationally representative.  
Bootstrapped standard errors, adjusted for school-level clustering using 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations of both the first-
stage and second-stage models, are displayed in parentheses below each estimate.   
** significant at .05 level; * significant at .10 level.  
 
Table 7:  Effects of NCLB Pressure on Student Learning and Motivation 
 







Panel I (35 states)                      
On the AYP Margin  0.073** 0.043   0.049    -0.031  0.148*  -0.051   
(.033)  (.041)   (.035)   (.069)   (.082)   (.037)   
Panel II (35 states)                   
On the AYP Margin based on the performance of…           
Overall student group   0.010  0.092   0.040    0.061   0.282** 0.005   
    (.051) (.073) (.058) (.116) (.144) (.063)   
Student's subgroup (not overall)  0.053 0.014  0.074   -0.012   0.109 -0.038   
(.051) (.074) (.05) (.103) (.153) (.05)   
Other subgroup(s) (not overall or 
student's subgroup) 
 
0.108** 0.030   0.034    -0.078  0.099 -0.086  * 
 (.041) (.051) (.038)  (.082) (.099) (.044)   
Panel III (27 states)                   
On the AYP Margin * 
Student on the bubble for Passing 
 
-0.035 0.080 0.075         0.113  0.081 0.018   
(.060) (.090) (.053) (.147) (.191) (.064)   
On the AYP Margin        0.056   -0.013 0.034          0.002        0.146 -0.059   
  (.039) (.047) (.039) (.078) (.101) (.044)   
 
Notes to Table 7:  Each column displays estimates from three student-level models using data from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Survey-Kindergarten Cohort (ECLS).  Panel 
I displays estimates of the coefficient on whether the school was on the AYP margin in the relevant subject: math for math test performance or enjoyment, reading for reading test 
performance or enjoyment, and either math or reading for science test performance or anxiety about standardized tests.  To decompose the first panel results by the type of 
subgroup(s) that were on the AYP margin, Panel II's models use three mutually exclusive indicators that sum to “On the AYP Margin” variable.  Panel III's models use the same 
independent variable as in Panel I, but add an interaction term with a dummy variable for whether the student is on the bubble for passing the state's NCLB exam in the relevant 
subject; this dummy variable also enters the model separately and its creation is described in the text of Section 5.  All models control for the variables listed in the "ECLS sample" 
column of Table 2, plus state fixed effects, an indicator for whether the school is predicted to be below the margin for making AYP, and squared and cubic terms for the student's 
standardized math and reading performance in both the first and third grade waves of the ECLS.  Dependent variables are from the fifth grade wave of the ECLS.  Sample sizes are 
approximately 6,860 students for the first two panels and 5,630 students for Panel III, (rounded to the nearest 10 to comply with data reporting requirements).  The smaller sample 
for Panel III is due to missing information concerning the difficulty of six states' NCLB exams.  The estimates in Panels I and II remain fairly similar if we restrict the sample to 
the roughly 5,630 observations used to estimate the models of Panel III.  All models weight observations using the student-level longitudinal sample weights provided in the ECLS 
data.  Bootstrapped standard errors, adjusted for school-level clustering using 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations of both the first-stage and second-stage models, are displayed in 
parentheses below each estimate. 
** significant at .05 level; * significant at .10 level.  
 
 
Appendix 1. Sources of Collected AYP Data  
  
       




   We have 
collected 
 
Not available   
State Abbreviations 
Where Data are Not 
Available  
                        
States in 2002-2003                        
School made AYP     24     44    0    — 
Subgroup made AYP     5     38 
 
9




, IA, ME, NE, NM, 
ND, OK, WI, WY 
 
Percent proficient by 
subgroup     16     41    5     AL, ME, NE, NH, WV 
 
Number of students in 
subgroup 
   2     34 
 
15   
  
 
AL, CO, DE, HI, ID, IA, 
ME, MS, NE, ND, OH, 
OK, SD, WV, WY 
                        
States in 2003-2004                       
School made AYP     48     46    0    — 
 
Subgroup made AYP     39     40    4     IA, NE, NM, ND 
 
Percent proficient by 
subgroup 
   16     44 
 
3     AL, NE, NH 
 
Number of students in 
subgroup 
   1     37 
 
10   
 
CO, ID, IA, ME, MS, 
NE, ND, OH, SD, WY 
Notes to Appendix 1: Existing databases refer to School Data Direct and the National AYP and Identification Database 
Number of states per row can exceed 50 because we collected data in states included in existing databases.   
(i) For schools in Arizona, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, due to otherwise missing data, we impute whether some 
subgroups made AYP in 2002-2003 using their 2002-2003 proficiency rates and their states’ published standards.  
(ii) Although Alabama did not publish whether student subgroups made AYP in 2002-2003, we can include Alabama schools 




Appendix 2: Predicting the Probability of Making AYP  
 
We run state-specific regressions using the data described below to generate predictions of the likelihood 
that each numerically-significant student subgroup and (by extension) their school would pass AYP in the 
spring of both 2003 and 2004 in the subjects of reading and math.  To be as consistent as possible in our 
state-by-state predictions of which student subgroups were on the AYP margin, we applied a set of rules 
to the construction of data to generate subgroup-level AYP failure predictions.  The table on the following 
page explains the data construction in detail. 
 
We use a specific subgroup’s 2001-2002 proficiency rate wherever available to predict that subgroup’s 
likelihood of making AYP in 2003 and 2004 (note these are cross-sectional measures of a subgroup’s 
performance).  For privacy protection, the 2001-2002 test score data is typically missing for groups below 
a state-determined minimum size (e.g., fewer than 20 students).  Thus, for schools where subgroup 
enrollment grew between 2001-2002 and 2004, there might be AYP determinations for a subgroup in 
2004 but no 2001-2002 proficiency rate.  (In the rare case, the 2001-2002 suppression rules redacted data 
for groups larger than minimum subgroup size requirements for AYP accountability.)  To retain these 
cases in our sample, we specified an alternate version of the probit regression, where we assign the 
school-wide 2001-2002 proficiency rate to all student subgroups within the school regardless of whether 
we possessed subgroup-specific 2001-2002 proficiency rates.  In this case, we add an interaction term 
with a variable measuring the fraction of the school-wide population composed of students in the relevant 
subgroup.  We then use predictions from the alternate probit version in cases when predictions were 
missing from the main specification. 
 
Sometimes entire subgroups were dropped from probit regressions when there was not any within-
subgroup variation in the subject in the state (e.g., there were only 11 numerically-significant Asian 
subgroups in 2004 among Washington’s elementary schools and all 11 passed AYP their math and 
reading proficiency targets).  In cases where subgroups’ success or failure was perfectly determined, we 
overwrote their missing probabilities of making AYP with predicted probabilities obtained from OLS 
regressions that used the same set of predictors.  This practice was of little consequence, because 
subgroups in these cases were always classified as having either low or high likelihoods of making AYP 
(they never fall in the moderate category).  
 
Model Specification and Data Construction for State Probits Estimating Likelihood of Making AYP in 2003 and 2004  
Variable description   Data sources  Variable coding 
Dependent variable 
Subject-specific subgroup AYP 
proficient indicator  
Subjects are math and reading.   
Student subgroups are: school-wide; 
African American; Asian/Pacific 
Islander; Hispanic; White; Native 
American; Limited English Proficient; 
Disabled; Economically 
Disadvantaged; Filipino (when used 
by state); Asian (when used by 
state); Pacific Islander (when used by 
state); and Alaskan Native (when 
used by state).   
Wherever available, school report card data from states’ 
departments of education listing state’s own determinations 
of whether student subgroups passed their proficiency 
targets in the years 2002-2003 and 2003-2004.  State’s final 
yes/no determinations typically account for all forms of 
adjustment of subgroup raw proficiency rates (e.g., 2- or 3-
year averaging; confidence intervals; safe harbor; and 
appeals). 
When not available from state DOE sources, data is from 
SchoolDataDirect.org or the National AYP and Identification 
Database (for 2003-2004 only). 
In two states which lacked 2002-2003 proficiency target 
data from all three sources of data, we constructed the 
variable using each state’s published raw subgroup 
proficiency rates, which we adjusted using the state’s 
documented confidence interval methods (if applicable) to 
determine whether each subgroup passed, failed, or was 
not applicable.  This approximation method had greater than 
90% accuracy when tested in two populous states with 
complete data. 
Equals 0 if the subgroup failed its AYP subject-specific proficiency target 
in either 2002-2003 or 2003-2004. 
Equals 1 if the subgroup (a) passed its AYP proficiency target in the 
given subject in 2002-2003 and 2003-2004, or (b) passed in one year 
and numerically insignificant in the other year. 
Equals missing if the subgroup was numerically insignificant in both 
years (according to the state’s own definition of numerical significance).   
For states that further break out AYP proficiency targets by grade level 
or grade span, subgroup indicators are specific to each accountable 
grade level/span, using the same rules for creating values of missing, 
zero, or one.   
Two states did not use subgroup-level pass rates to determine schools’ 
AYP status in 2002-2003.  In each case, only 2004 subgroup-level AYP 
proficiency target data was used to construct the dependent variable. 
Two states only published whether the subgroup passed AYP in each 
subject overall (a measure that includes both the subgroup’s proficiency 
rate and its participation rate for that subject).  In these cases, we used 
this overall subject measure in lieu of proficiency-only indicators.   
Independent variables 
Subgroup test performance in 
focal subject in 2001-2002 
(entered into model as linear, 
squared, and cubed terms) 
National Longitudinal School-Level State Assessment Score 
Database 
When available, we use the subgroup’s unadjusted 5th grade proficiency 
rate on the statewide test administered in 2001-2002 for the focal 
subject. (We selected grade 5 because our second stage of analysis 
examines ECLS student outcomes in 2003-2004, when the majority of 
ECLS students are fifth graders.)  
For states not reporting performance for particular subgroups, we use 
the overall student performance in the focal subject in the selected grade 
level in that school.  As described in the text, we supplement those 
models with interaction terms between the test performance variable and 
the fraction of students who are members of that subgroup. 
For 6 states where proficiency rates are unavailable, we instead use the 
reported percentile rank scores or scale scores.   
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Variable description   Data sources  Variable coding 
For states that did not test grade 5 in 2001-2002, we use the next closest 
lower tested grade level (i.e., grade 4, grade 3) or, if that is unavailable, 
the next closest higher tested grade (i.e., grade 6, grade 7).  The models 
then include observations for all schools in that state with test 
performance variables in the relevant grade levels.  When these models 
include test performance from two different grade levels (e.g., 4th and 
6th), we also include a dichotomous dummy variable indicating whether 
the test variable values come from students in the higher grade. 
In states that further break out subgroups’ AYP proficiency targets by 
grade levels or grade spans, we run separate models for each high-
stakes grade for schools serving 5th graders. Depending on availability, 
we use 2001-2002 test performance variables from either the same 
grade, the next lowest grade, or the next highest grade. 
Pct. that the student subgroup 
comprised of the denominator for 
its 2001-2002 proficiency rate 
value  
(entered as a main effect, and 
interacted with the three 2002 
proficiency rate terms) 
National Longitudinal School-Level State Assessment Score 
Database 
Where student subgroup size not present in State 
Assessment Score database, data is from the Common 
Core of Data.   
Equals 1 when the subgroup’s own proficiency rate available from 2001-
2002.  Otherwise, ranges from 0 to 1, and is equal to the ratio of enrolled 
students in the given subgroup in 2001-2002 within the school (from 
CCD) to the total number of enrolled students in the school.  Since data 
about the number of LEP students and disabled students is not available 
at the school level in the CCD, we substituted in 2003-2004 AYP 
subgroup size ratios for the LEP and disabled subgroups.  If this 
subgroup size data not available in a state for 2003-2004, then we use 
district-level LEP and disabled ratios (applicable to three states).   
Size of the student subgroup in 
2003-2004  
(entered as 1/sqrt(size), and this term 
is also interacted with the three 2002 
proficiency rate terms and the three 
2002 proficiency rate x 2002 pct.  
group interaction terms)  
Wherever available, school report card data from state 
departments of education that list student subgroup size 
(using AYP definitions).  Where not available from state 
sources, then drawn from 2003-2004 data in the National 
Longitudinal School-Level State Assessment Score 
Database or the 2003-2004 Common Core of Data.   
This variable is derived from the state’s count of continuously enrolled 
students per student subgroup accountable under NCLB (note that 
states’ definitions of “continuous enrollment” for the purposes of AYP 
accountability differ somewhat from state definitions for state 
accountability systems or just cross-sectional enrollment counts as of the 
fall in the school year). 
Where state sources are not available, size is estimated using 2004 
State Assessment Score data about number of students tested per 
subgroup.  If this source is not available for the state, we used grade-
specific CCD enrollment data and district-level LEP and disabled ratios 
and applied them to school-by-grade-level membership.  
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Variable description   Data sources  Variable coding 
Indicators for years held 
accountable 
The same data source used to obtain the dependent 
variable. 
Two dichotomous variables indicating whether the subgroup was only 
numerically significant in 2003 (but not 2004) in the focal subject and, 
vice versa, numerically significant in 2004 (but not 2003) in the focal 
subject. The omitted category is the subgroup is numerically significant 
in both 2003 and 2004. 
Subgroup indicators  Constructed  A series of dichotomous variables indicating the student subgroup to 
which the observation belongs.  The omitted category is the campus-
wide student group. 
School-level characteristics in 
2001-2002: 
(a)  percent of students who are 
black 
(b)  percent of students who are 
Hispanic 
(c)  percent of students who are 
Asian 
(d)  percent of students who qualify 
for a free- or reduced-price 
meal 
(e)  whether the school is Title I 
eligible 
(f)  total student membership 
Common Core of Data 2001-2002 school-level data  We constructed the racial and economic demographic using total student 
membership as the denominator.  In cases where categories of school-
level data were missing from 2002 state files, the variables were 
constructed using the next closest year in which those variables were 
present in CCD files (2000-2001, then 2002-2003, then 1999-2000, etc.) 
 